Operational Closure and Self-Referentiality. Hume&apos;s Theory of Causal Inference from the Standpoint of Second-Order Cybernetics by Cevolini, Alberto
Cybernetics and Human Knowing. Vol. 19, no. 3, pp. xx-xxOperational Closure and Self-Referentiality
Hume’s Theory of Causal Inference from the
Standpoint of Second-order Cybernetics
Alberto Cevolini1
This article deals essentially with the problem of how operationally closed systems can construct a 
reality and therefore get their bearings in the world. But rather than looking for new and therefore 
original theoretical solutions, it suggests going back to the empirical philosophical tradition of early 
modernity, in order to find some of the roots of a solution. Following a suggestion by the leaders of 
both first- and second-order cybernetics, Wiener and Foerster, this article reframes David Hume’s 
theory of causal inference in order to make the case that Hume not only anticipated second-order 
cybernetics in interesting ways, but also that we can use Hume and second-order cybernetics to 
inform each other leading to a better understanding of both. Starting from the statement according to 
which the problem of causality represents “one of the most sublime questions in philosophy,” the 
article goes deeply inside the problem of causality in order to argue that the modern approach to 
epistemology has to conceive it as a process of internalization of cognitive facts. This search path 
leads to casting a new light on the paramount concept of sign, conceived of as the possibility that 
certain environmental events or data again set off the self-reference of a cognitive system, which 
thus switches from memory to expectation. The aim of this article is finally to show that the main 
results of an interdisciplinary theory of cognition such as second-order cybernetics are particularly 
congruent with the speculations of the Scottish philosopher, and that Hume’s reflections maintain an 
extraordinary relevance regarding the most advanced elaboration of the main epistemological 
problems.
I
Hume described the problem of causality as “one of the most sublime questions in
philosophy” (T 1.3.14, p. 156).2 His inquiry still represents a turning point for
everyone who deals with the same problem. However, his impact goes beyond the
simple question of causality, as can be explained by reference to the modern
revolution in the theory of cognition. In this article we argue that such a revolution has
to be conceived of as a process of internalization of cognitive facts. This leads Hume
to see causality not as a metaphysical phenomenon but as a construction of the mind,
according to its capacity to co-ordinate, during its observations, both self- and hetero-
reference, and to structure the outcome of that co-ordination in the form of a cognitive
memory. In order to follow Hume’s reasoning we will use some fundamental concepts
of second-order cybernetics, showing that the main results of that interdisciplinary
theory of cognition are particularly congruent with the speculations of the Scottish
philosopher; at the same time, we will show that Hume’s reflections still have, for the
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2 Alberto Cevolinisame reason, an extraordinary relevance regarding the most advanced elaboration of
the problems of cognition.3 The aim of such comparison is not simply to link together
historically remote theories of human knowing in order to look eventually for
forerunners, but rather to contribute to the setting-up of an as sharp as possible
constructivist theory of cognitive systems. This path of search goes through a strict
rethinking of the main outcomes of the operational closure and leads to cast new light
on the paramount concept of sign conceived of as an operationalizing form of the
unity of the difference between system and environment, according to the original
intuition of first-order cybernetics about the capability of complex enough systems to
compensate their lack of direct contact with the external environment through the
building of internal structures. In this way a new possibility arises for semiotics to
settle down in the theoretical frame of reference of cybernetics, opening up a
searching space that is still largely unexplored. The text we shall constantly refer to in
order to start up such a work is the enlightening synthesis of the theory of causal
inference in which Hume maintains that: “after a repetition of similar instances the
mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual
attendant, and to believe that it will exist” (EHU 7.59, p. 75).
II
Second-order cybernetics holds the distinction between system and environment to be
the starting point for every explanation of cognitive problems, and labels as observing
systems all those which are able to use distinctions (for example: before/after, cause/
effect) in order to observe reality. Such an approach has some fundamental
implications for the construction of a general theory of cognition: since system/
environment is a distinction which has to be used by some observing system to
observe observing systems, such a theory excludes the possibility that the world can
be observed from the outside, because it always includes the observer itself into the
world of observation. This is a turning point compared to the first-order cybernetics,
because it implies an epistemological shifting from a linear paradigm, based on the
principle of teleology, to a circular paradigm, based on the principle of self-
referentiality.
For first-order cybernetics the matter was that of clarifying the presuppositions of
natural or artificial machines having a purposeful behavior, that is to say which are
able to use the results of previous movements (output) as information (input) to
control and eventually correct their next movement and reduce in such a way the
deviation from a fore-established distinction (Wiener, Bigelow & Rosenblueth, 1943).
For second-order cybernetics the matter is instead that of clarifying, how complex
enough machines can compute consistent indicators of external reality, that is
eigenbehaviors, without confusing such a reality with their own operations (Foerster,
3. We don’t obviously assume that Hume is a second-order thinker (such a conclusion would be in fact anomalous 
and anachronistic) but rather that the outcomes of his speculations are congruent with the result of second-order 
cybernetics, as already recognized both by Wiener and by Foerster (see section III).
Operational Closure and Self-referentiality 31981a; 1985, esp. pp. 114-115; 1992, p. 10f.). The topic, that is, the behavior, remains
the same; what changes is the way of facing it: whereas first-order cybernetics is
bound to a perspective, which is in some way still realist, and deals with the
environment as if it were an autonomous space, second-order cybernetics tries to
explain how it is possible for a self-referential system to face a reality that appears as
an external correlate of its internal operations. Among the systemic references which
lend to this type of explanation the most studied is without any doubt the human mind:
it still represents the ultimate standard for the construction of learning machines, just
as contemporary cognitive sciences try to explain its functioning as if it were a
cybernetic machine.
Hume (EHU 2.12, p. 18) supposes that on an operative level the mind is able to
connect and compare to each other only the operations (he speaks of perceptions)
which are reproduced by the mind itself. Between mind and world there is therefore a
clear break that prevents the mind from directly accessing the external environment,
while at the same time preventing the environment from contributing in any way to
the reproduction of perceptions in the mind. Such a principle of operational closure is
by no means new: Aristotelian-Thomist epistemology already supported the thesis
that the mind’s activity (intelligere) is not a transitive action (actio transiens).4
Berkeley (1998, I, § 8, p. 105) however radicalized that principle by maintaining that
it is not possible to verify whether or not there exists outside the mind something that
matches the idea we have of reality, since an idea can be compared only with another
idea and not directly with reality itself. Hume scrupulously assimilates Berkeley’s
enquiries, reaching the conclusion that what happens in the environment cannot have
information value for the observer who makes experience of reality. A clear example,
in causal terms, is that of Adam, who, though his rational faculties were perfect from
the start, could not have inferred from the transparency of water, without any
experience of it, its power to suffocate.5 However, the fact that operational closure
makes it impossible to transfer information from the environment into the system (and
vice versa) becomes even clearer if the environment is conceived of temporally as
time-to-come; a system can only operate in the current present, when it operates,
whereas the future still remains by definition unreachable—a crucial point in Hume’s
theory of causal inference to which we shall return.
From this theoretical background there emerges a fundamental bifurcation on
which the very development of a modern theory of cognition depends. Whereas the
Aristotelian-Thomist tradition conceived of operational closure as a problem to be
solved by answering the question of how it is possible for human reason to know
reality despite the fact that it cannot operate beyond its own boundaries, for Hume it
represents rather an essential requirement for the construction of structures which
allow the mind to keep a distance from the surrounding environment and thereby gain,
4.  Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus, III, 70-71; V, 107.
5.  “No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or 
the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference 
concerning real existence and matter of fact” (EHU 4.23, p. 27).
4 Alberto Cevolinion a cognitive level, a proper autonomy. Closure forces every operation (every
perception of the mind) to become part of a recursive network of other operations of
the same kind, which every current operation is referring to, setting off what in
cybernetic terms may be described as a self-organizing dynamics from which
contingent indicators of reality (i.e., invariants) arise, and can be used by the system to
get its bearings in a world that appears on the empirical level different every time. All
Hume’s reasoning aims to demonstrate that any causal inference is nothing but the
arising outcome of such self-organizing dynamics. What we aim to clarify is the
essential dynamics of such dynamics; that is, how it works.
III
As we have shown, according to Hume causality cannot be learned by gathering
information coming directly from the reality of which the mind makes experience; nor
can it be learned a priori on the basis of logical-deductive reasoning: the simple idea
of a stone [APA does not use single quotation marks, nor are concepts marked] is not
enough to suggest the an event that follows (i.e., the fact that, after being thrown in the
air, the stone falls back down rather than staying in suspension). The only option is
experience.6 This opens up two fundamental questions. First, how is it possible for the
mind to become able to produce inductive inferences starting from empirical
experience? Secondly, what depends on the reliability of conclusions drawn out in
such a way from experience? Since in Hume’s opinion the last question “may be of
more difficult solution and explication” (EHU 4.28, p. 32), we shall start by
attempting to give an adequate answer to the first.
When Hume speaks of experience, he is referring, in modern terms, to the mind’s
operation of observation in which self- and hetero-reference are actively concomitant.
Outside the mind there exists a real world, which the mind can experience only in the
form of an idea. Or to put it in traditional terms: When the mind is thinking of a stone,
there is no stone in the mind, but only the idea of the stone (Aristotle, De anima, III, 8,
431b28-432a3). This implies, as we have seen, that the mind cannot compare idea and
reality with each other to verify whether they have the same form (i.e., whether they
are isomorphic). The only thing the mind can do is operationally relate ideas with
other ideas, and from this difference try to gain information. Any causal inference is a
mental performance, consisting simply of a peculiar union of ideas. Such a union is a
form of association.
6. “I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this 
relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience” (EHU 4.23, 
p. 27). See also Hume (EHU 4.25, p. 29). In the Treatise (T 1.3.1, p. 69) Hume speaks of abstract reasoning: 
“’Tis evident cause and effect are relations, of which we receive information from experience, and not from any 
abstract reasoning or reflexion”. And to seal the question: “’Tis easy to observe, that in tracing this relation, the 
inference we draw from cause and effect is not deriv’d merely from a survey of these particular objects, and from 
such a penetration into their essences as may discover the dependence of the one upon the other. There is no 
object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look 
beyond the ideas which we form of them. ... ’Tis therefore by experience only, that we can infer the existence of 
one object from that of another” (T 1.3.6, pp. 86-87).
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readily recall another. Three different kinds of association can be distinguished:
resemblance (as for example that between the idea of father and the idea of son);
contiguity in time or space (as for example that between the idea of apartment and the
idea of other apartments in the same building); and the relation of cause and effect
(T 1.1.4, pp. 10-11; EHU 3.19, p. 24). In the last case the association does not arise
spontaneously in the mind, but is produced through the experience of the constant
conjunction of at least two contiguous phenomena, one of which is precedent while
the other is successive; for example, heat compared to flame. Such an experience can
also be produced experimentally, as the theory of conditioned reflexes has
demonstrated; the association occurs here at the level of the central nervous system,
therefore in a psychological dimension, between environmental data working
concomitantly and physiological stimuli which can activate in the organism some
unconditioned reflex.7 This approach raises two questions: what conditions will
trigger in the mind an association of this kind? And how is it possible, in the second
place, to set off the same association again in all time-different concrete situations?
[You need to explain why you want these items italicized. Italics are not used for
emphasis and these are not unusual terminology.]
First of all, Hume stresses the fact that among the phenomena we make
experience of the mind can recognize a relationship of contiguity and temporal
priority: one event (or object) occurs before the other, but according to a relation of
contiguity perceived immediately in the mind, there will be an impression that some
strong connection must exist between them.8 If instead too much time passes between
the occurring of a certain event (or object) and the occurring of the following linked
one, the mind could make experience in the meantime of countless other events (or
objects) and would no longer be able to determine what should be associated with
what. Everything could be connected with everything, with the consequence that
nothing would be definitively connected with anything. The world would appear, in
other terms, too complex, and the mind would end up forgetting that there exists a
relationship between the phenomenon P1 and the attendant phenomenon P2. The
associating connection works, on the contrary, as a reduction form of the
environmental complexity which the system (the mind) uses to make expectations
about what could happen. These expectations are never necessary, but rather always
contingent: sooner or later each observer has to admit that stones don’t fall down on
the moon in the same way as on the earth. Necessity, on the other hand, is the correlate
of expectation; and it exists, as we shall see, only as a projection produced by the mind
which has learned to infer.
7. See Pavlov, 1927. First-order cybernetics had explicitly drawn attention to the importance of the concept of 
association in relation to the problem of learning in machines, and it acknowledged Hume and Pavlov as the two 
best forerunners in this field of research (see Wiener, 1961, chapter 5).
8. “We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of object; and also remember, that 
the individuals of another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of 
contiguity and succession with regard to them” (T 1.3.6, p. 87; italics added).
6 Alberto CevoliniTo the relationship of priority and contiguity has to be added the principle of
repetition. According to Hume it is not enough that the conjunction of two phenomena
has been experienced once; the mind needs rather to compare other similar instances
(i.e., phenomena of the same set), in which the same causes have in the past produced
the same effects, although the conditions were different every time. Only in this way
can the impression that between such causes and their effects there is a conjunction,
change itself into the certainty that there is a necessary connection. In the Treatise it is
clearly suggested that “we have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain
objects, which have been always conjoin’d together, and which in all past instances
have been found inseparable” (T 1.3.6, p. 93). Further, in the Enquiry Hume confirms
that causality “arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular
objects are constantly conjoined with each other” (EHU 4.23, p. 27; italics added).
Even the idea of necessary connection between causes and effects “arises from a
number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events,”
after which the mind has experienced that “one particular species of event has always,
in all instances, been conjoined with another” (EHU 7.59, pp. 74-75; italics added).
Hume defines the outcome of such past repetition as ‘habit’ or ‘custom’ (T 1.3.8,
p. 102), and maintains that this alone pushes the mind to associate one idea with
another, because “the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a
propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any
reasoning or process of understanding.” This leads to the conclusion that “all
inferences from experience ... are affects of custom, not of reasoning” (EHU 5.36,
p. 43).
The result of this seemingly complicated process is to make the mind able to go
beyond the evidence of sensations, by separating itself on the temporal dimension
from its own environment through the performing of anticipations, which make it
possible to transfer acquired experience to all instances which have been not yet
experienced.9 This particular transcendence can be performed only on a high level of
abstraction, which cannot be reached by perception, since it is always inevitably
bound to the transience of sensations. This is the reason why custom works on the
basis of ideas in the mind, and finally constitutes “the great guide of human life”
(EHU 5.36, p. 44). Without inference, as Jerrold Katz (1962, p. 5) has clearly
propounded, our knowledge of the world would be dependent everywhere on the
present situation, and would be confined to what we could directly observe. Such a
dependence on the concrete situation would force the observer, who would not wish to
face a perpetually new and surprising (because unpredictable) reality, to map one-to-
one the surrounding world and to compare present situations with past maps. Yet this
9. “All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of 
that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses” (EHU 4.21, p. 26). Custom works 
so that “in all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either expressly or 
tacitly, either directly or indirectly” (T 1.3.8, p. 105). Custom is therefore “that principle alone which renders our 
experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have 
appeared in the past” (EHU 5.36, p. 44).
Operational Closure and Self-referentiality 7would lead rapidly to an information overload, which would slow down the system’s
operations until they stop. For Hume this means that it is not necessary to recall the
memory of all past instances in which one has experienced a certain object (as if one
were rewinding a tape upon which all past experiences have been recorded), to infer
the future occurrence of its attendant events (T 1.3.8, pp. 103-104). The way out is for
the mind to abstract from its own experience and produce a symbolic representation of
external reality, by means of which it is possible to forget almost everything except
what remains the same and is therefore worth being recorded.10 Such a computation
of invariants (or universals) is a process of generalization from the concomitance of
P1 and P2, that enables the observer to state, of anything that has the property P1, that
it also has the property P2, leaving aside the concrete peculiarity of the object in which
the property P1 is recognized or the particular moment at which the event P2 can occur
(Katz, 1962, p. 3; see also Foerster, 1969, p. 27). This does not help the mind (the
observer) to gain information about the external reality and to know thereby what
would be better to do; the external environment remains operationally unreachable
and therefore always inevitably uncertain. In other words: the mind has no way to
reach the real world, but can isolate from the data of its own experience only that
which recurs and condense it in the form of meaningful patterns (e.g., flame heats) or
patterns of reaction, which are kept available to be confirmed in future experiences.11
Regarding this, second-order cybernetics speaks of eigenbehaviors (or
eigenvalues) as tokens for dynamic equilibriums which function as indicators of
reality for observing systems (Foerster, 1981c; Kauffman, 2005, pp. 133ff., 2009,
pp. 122ff with the model of a infinite nest of boxes). Hume’s concept of habit or
custom is the common name which denotes, one could say, all indicators of this sort:
they are not simply psychological qualities, but rather cognitive functions which make
it possible to anticipate a not-yet-present effect starting from the actual experience of
certain causes, or to go back to the no-longer-present causes starting from the actual
experience of their effects. Obviously the inferential performance makes present what
is absent not on the level of concrete reality, but on the level of symbolic elaboration
of ideas; thus any inference can only be performed by the mind, that is to say in the
form of observation, not simply in the form of operation. The advantage, in cognitive
terms, is clear: the mind does not have to make experience of any objects in the world
which belong to a certain set (e.g., ball), in order to understand what kind of object it
is dealing with; it’s enough that it does recognize, by referring to the currently
available data, the quality: to be usable as a ball, and ascribes such quality to the
object, coming thus to the conclusion: This is a ball. In this sense objects are tokens, a
statement that clearly de-ontologizes the concept of object. [If what follows a colon is
a complete sentence, the first word is capitalized, otherwise not.]
10. See the important essay of Foerster, Inselberg & Weston (1968, esp. pp. 34-35). Second-order cybernetics speaks 
of cognitive memory, because memory works without record (Foerster, 1981b).
11. I use the concepts condensation and confirmation in the same sense as Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form (1979). 
Concepts are not marked. Acceptable alternative: I use the terms condensation and confirmation in the same…
8 Alberto CevoliniHume expresses this point of view when he states that, on coming upon a river, a
person does not have to take into consideration all the qualities of the surrounding
world, but can foresee the consequences of proceeding forward by referring to himself
and his past experience (T 1.3.8, p. 103)—a form of reference which has finally a
value of information (of a particular conjunction of causes and effects). But how is it
possible to make habits operative again if they are themselves not operations, but
rather meaningful patterns? In other words, how can that association of ideas which
makes causal inference possible, be set off again?
IV
A first point to which we have to draw attention concerns the temporal dimension of
the availability of eigenvalues. Habit is the arising outcome of past experiences, but it
is always present to the mind, which can make it operative from time to time when
facing the same data or environmental events. Hume clearly states: Custom is that
“belief, which attends the present impression, and is produc’d by a number of past
impressions and conjunctions” (T 1.3.8, p. 102). This attendant relationship
constitutes a crucial point in the analysis of causal inference. In order to imagine,
starting from the data currently available, what future development events will have,
the mind must be able to refer to the outcomes of its past experiences, condensed by
means of symbolic representations in an abstract and generalized form. But this
implies that the mind refers to itself while referring to something different from itself,
in order to give meaning to the current situation. It has thus to co-ordinate
concomitantly, during its own observations, self- and hetero-reference,12 allotting
primacy to self-reference. This is unlike what happens in non-inferential observations,
in which it is rather the fact that the mind can refer to something different from itself
that allows the mind to refer to itself and to its own operations (since we first of all
think of something, we know that we are thinking). Primacy here does not mean
exclusion. Rather, and paradoxically, the environment becomes informative on the
basis of what can be taken for granted. During the association that impels the mind to
infer the idea of effect from the idea of the related cause (or vice versa), the mind
coordinates the redundancy that it has drawn out through abstraction from its past
experiences (habit, custom) with the variety of the currently concrete situation, and
uses such redundancy as an attractor for further information processing. Such a
process might be summarized in the following schema:
12. Costa (1986, p. 144) speaks of a system of perceptions that intertwines with a system of ideas of memory to 
produce the percipient’s internal representation of reality; however he doesn’t explain the nature of this 
intertwining.
Operational Closure and Self-referentiality 9Figure 1: Form and Structure of a Cognitive Memory
This process goes on, however, not arbitrarily. In order for the theory to be
plausible, we need to explain what compels the mind to refer to itself rather than
simply to something different from itself. The repetition of the attendant relationship
that is experienced by the mind between an environmental event and a contiguous one,
does indeed transform the very nature of the event: In other words, it acquires the
function of a signal. On this point, Hume rigorously summarizes Berkeley’s survey.
Starting from a semiotic analysis of language, where “a word becomes general by
being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea but, of several particular ideas,
any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind,” Berkeley (1998, Intro., §§ 11-
12, p. 94) comes, on the basis of the same reasoning, to the conclusion that there are
no abstract general ideas: The idea is always an idea of something particular and
individual, which becomes general only because it is used to represent or to stand for
[I don’t understand why you wish stand for italicized, but not represent. Of the two,
represent is the technical term; stand for is common vernacular.] all other particular
ideas of the same sort. For Hume this is without any doubt “one of the greatest and
most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters”
(T 1.1.7, p. 17) and his opinion is that it could be further enhanced by adding an
explanation of how the process makes signs arise. 
The starting point is always the paradox “that some ideas are particular in their
nature, but general in their representation [italics in original? Please answer this
question!]” (T 1.1.7, p. 22). This paradox can be solved if one takes into account the
fact that, after having repeatedly experienced similar objects, the mind ascribes the
same name to these objects, putting aside any differences which depend on secondary
properties, such as quality or quantity (T 1.1.7, p. 20). Such an acquired custom
contributes decisively to ensure that the particular idea can be used in a general way; it
is indeed only the customary conjunction, revived by the general term which has been
                               Confirmation 
Variety
Self-reference   / Hetero-reference
Redundancy
    Condensation
10 Alberto Cevoliniannexed to that idea, that readily recalls to the mind all other ideas of the same sort (T
1.1.7, pp. 21-22). Thus the idea is ever particular regarding to the object but becomes
general regarding its use as a sign of any other particular ideas of such an object. If
then the customary connection concerns two environmental data or events, the idea of
the one can become for the mind a sign that refers to the idea of the other, putting into
being that association which underlies the relationship between cause and effect. As
experiments on conditioned reflexes have also demonstrated, this signity is neither an
intrinsic property of some environmental objects—there are no such things as signs—
nor a particular system’s operation. The existence-place of a sign is, so to speak,
neither inside (in the system), nor outside (in the environment), but in their
‘between’.13 Every sign is therefore the arising result of the difference between
system and environment and signity represents the possibility that certain
environmental events or data again set off the self-reference of the involved system,
which thus switches from memory to expectation. Water is for example a signal for
the mind which is carried by habit to infer its suffocating power, just as a footprint on
the beach is a signal of the fact that someone has walked there – which could not be
inductively inferred, if one did not know from experience that foot pressure on the
sand leaves a print.
The transition from memory to expectation is not a real process that takes time.
Hume emphasizes that, on the contrary, habit works immediately, i.e. before there is
time to reflect or to recall to the memory all past instances that have been
experienced.14 And he adds that “’twill here be worth our observation, that the past
experience, on which our judgments concerning cause and effect depend, may operate
on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even
in same measure be unknown to us” (T 1.3.8, p. 103). Habit works, in other words,
without being an object of attention, and in this sense memory, like redundancy, acts
as the “invisible hand” [If this is a reference to Adam Smith’s terminology, I think
quotation marks are appropriate.] of the system. To draw inferences the mind does not
need to link together two different operations; all it has to do is combine in the same
operation of observation two different references which may be distinguished from
each other on an analytical, but not empirical, level. This is possible because the mind
operates recursively and every emerging effect is the correlate of a computation of
computations, to put it in the terms of second-order cybernetics. This implies that each
operation of observation comes into being as the unity of the difference between a
reference to the past and a reference to the future; that is to say, as a result of previous
and a presupposition of subsequent operations of the same sort.15 Since every link
13. Such a starting point opens up a new field of research, which gets near what has been labeled cybersemiotics —
understood not as a semiotic theory of cybernetics, but as a cybernetic theory of semiotics. See above all the 
pioneering works of Brier (2008, esp. pp. 78ff. about library and information sciences; 2010, esp. pp. 31-32).
14. For Hume the belief that a certain effect follows the occurring of a certain cause “arises immediately, without any 
new operation of the reason or imagination” (T 1.3.8, p. 102; italics added). And shortly afterwards he states that 
“when we are accustom’d to see two impressions conjoin’d together, the appearance or idea of the one 
immediately carries us to the idea of the other” (T 1.3.8, p. 103; italics added). Finally: “The custom operates 
before we have time for reflexion” (T 1.3.8, p. 104).
Operational Closure and Self-referentiality 11between operations renews their referring relationship to each other, the ability to
draw inferences depends ultimately on the memories available to the mind (the
system). Or, in terms of second-order cybernetics: Drawing inferences means “to
compute future events from past experience” (Foerster, 1981b, p. 96; cf. also Foerster,
1967; Foerster, 1969, pp. 25ff.; p. 43), which is possible only if the observer is
supplied with memory—an assumption already clearly established by Hume, who
states that every causal inference would be impossible “without the help of our
memory and experience” (T 1.3.1, p. 70). This implies, at the same time, that the
inferential capability, as well as the sign quality of environmental data, is not a natural
power but depends on the observer, the consequence being that the same
environmental datum can be differently informative according to the habits to which it
is compared.16 These results allow us to draw some conclusions about the theory of
causality in particular and about the significance of Hume’s philosophical contribution
for the modern theory of cognition in general.
V
The aim of Hume’s survey on causality is to try to explain how it arises and what the
function of the idea of necessary connection is. Yet if one compares the results of the
Treatise with those of the Enquiry, the first impression could be that on this point there
is some ambiguity. In the Treatise Hume states explicitly that the idea of “necessary
connexion depends on the inference, instead of the inference’s depending on the
necessary connexion” (T 1.3.6, p. 88); but at the same time he believes that necessary
connection, together with contiguity and temporal priority, represent a fundamental
requisite for the activation of that association of ideas on which the processing of any
causal inference depends (T 1.3.6, p. 87). In the Enquiry the distinction between
conjunction and connexion is even stronger, and Hume confirms that to expect from
habit the conjunction of a certain effect with a certain cause is not yet sufficient to
justify the arising of the idea of a necessary connexion between them (EHU 7.54,
pp. 69-70). In short: “One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie
between them. They seem conjoined but never connected” (EHU 7.58, p. 74). But
later Hume solves the question by maintaining that because “one particular species of
event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer
scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other ... . We then call the one
object, Cause; the other, Effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between
them ... . It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises
from a number [but how many?] of similar instances which occur of the constant
15. For Deleuze (1981, pp. 95-96) custom combines in the same dynamics the push of the past with the rush into the 
future; such a synthesis of times is an inventive synthesis of the subject and it consists of putting the past as a rule 
for the future.
16. For Ashby (1956, § 6/21 and § 6/22) the unpredictability of any system’s behavior (machine or organism) is the 
correlate of such dependency of the observer upon memory. The behavior of the dog which rushes off and hides 
itself on hearing the roaring of a car cannot be explained until the observer is informed that two months ago the 
dog was knocked down by a car.
12 Alberto Cevoliniconjunction of these events” (EHU 7.59, p. 75). Hume suggests in this way that the
complete change from the simple conjunction to the necessary connection depends on
repetition. This is not a matter of calculating statistically the recurrence of the same
concomitance of cause and effect in order to anticipate the probability of the occurring
of a certain object (or event). Starting from current experience, according to Hume’s
theory of causality, the repetition works rather on the mind’s ability to produce
generalizations, which in turn, as we have seen, changes the nature of the mind’s
dealing with the same environmental data. This can now work as a signal, triggering
in the mind inferential performances of an inductive kind. So when Hume asks: “What
alteration has happened [in the mind of the observer] to give rise to this new idea of
connexion?” and he answers by saying: “Nothing but that he now feels these events to
be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the
appearance of the other” (EHU 7.59, pp. 75-76), such apparent tautology—the idea of
connexion arising only because the observer feels that events are connected—cannot
be explained without taking into account the circularity of the process that gives rise
to inference. The idea of necessary connection is nothing but the eidetic correlate of
habit and, like any eigenvalues which constitute a system’s redundancy, it is at the
same time both the outcome of past experience and the presupposition by which the
mind is compelled to associate the idea of effect to that of cause. In the Treatise Hume
confirms unambiguously this concurrence between necessary connexion and habit,
and thus the circularity itself of the functioning of causal inference, by maintaining
that “the necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our
inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition
arising from the accustom’d union. These are, therefore, the same” (T 1.3.14, p. 165).
This theoretical approach allows us to re-examine a problem that has been so long
debated: the possibility of justifying the principle of induction—a problem which has
long proved insoluble.17 For Hume, as is well known, the question concerns in general
the possibility of extending past experience to future (EHU 4.29, pp. 33-34). Since the
future is not available in an empirical way, one can legitimately ask on what the
trustworthiness of such transfer of the outcome of experience from past to future is
based. According to Hume such trustworthiness cannot be founded on reasoning
(syllogism), because there is no medium to link the premises with the conclusion
(EHU 4.29, p. 34); it cannot even be the result of probability reasoning, since the
foundation of such probability would be another time experience and the reasoning
would acquire in this way a circular movement (EHU 4.30, pp. 35-36). A pertinent
observation might be that the objects on which experience would be transferred are
similar to those already faced in the past, and it is a fact that “from causes which
appear similar we expect similar effects” (EHU 4.31, p. 36). That is to say that from
similar object (or events) “we expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like
effect” (EHU 4.32, p. 37). But that prompts another objection: if it would be asked
17. So Katz (1962, p. ix): “No justification of induction is possible” because “there can be no argument which is 
capable of fulfilling the conditions of the problem”. And again: “Attempting to justify induction is attempting to 
do the impossible” (p. 22). To which one may reply: if there is no solution, then there is no problem.
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back to past experience. In short, the inductive inference cannot be explained either in
an intuitive way, or in a demonstrative way; everyone who tries to justify it
experimentally ends up begging the question because “all inferences from experience
suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past” (EHU 4.32, p. 37).
In other terms, the validity of the theory of habit cannot be based on habit, and from
this vicious circle there is no escape.
On the other hand one could observe, as Gilles Deleuze (1981, p. 60) has done,
that habit is a principle of human nature and that it consists of the habit of developing
habits. This certainly does not solve the issue, but it at least suggests that another way
to go might be to set up the question from the very beginning in a self-referential way.
The mind does not need to produce scientifically verifiable hypotheses to switch from
past to future. It is enough that it can refer to itself and to its own habits to make
operationally present the concomitancy of a reference to the past and a reference to the
future.18 This self-referentiality is an unfounded property—a foundation without
foundation, so to speak—by means of which the mind can structure relatively stable
and consistent indicators of the reality it makes experience of every day. The
consistency of such indicators depends neither on the order of the concrete reality, nor
on the supposed stability of the laws of nature; rather, it depends on the constant
comparing by the mind of current experiences with developed habits. The memory
that allows causal inferences works in this sense as a check of consistency, whose
failure (i.e., forgetfulness) is the pre-requisite of learning. Induction, for the same
reason, does not help to distinguish between good and bad future trains of events (that
fire burns is as informative for the observer as the fact that after the ringing of a bell
there comes the giving of food), and nor even between true and false future trains of
events—which would re-open questions about the procedures for the validation or
vindication of truth. Not surprisingly Hume considers the expectation that one event
follows another as simply a mind’s belief, and defines the idea that between those
events there is a necessary connexion as something “which we feel in the mind” (EHU
7.59, p. 75).
If the whole reasoning so far developed is now revised, Hume appears as the first
philosopher who indeed shifts the problem of causality from external reality to the
observer (i.e., from the outside to the inside of the distinction system/environment).
For Hume this means that the causal connection shall no longer be sought among
qualities in the object, but must be found among the arising consequences of
observations in the mind (T 1.3.14, pp. 164-165). Such a process of internalization
involves a transition from reference to an observer-independent reality to reference to
an observer-dependent reality; that is to say, from the primacy of hetero- to the
18. Hume conceives of the immediacy of such concomitance as a determination from which the idea of necessity 
itself arises. “For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is 
determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its 
relation to the first object. ’Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity” 
(T 1.3.14, p. 156).
14 Alberto Cevoliniprimacy of self-reference, possible only if the observer is re-introduced into the
horizon of his observations. In Hume this process deals with the attempt to explain
how it is possible to jump from the succession of perceptions to the perception of
succession. If on the empirical level of current sensations the instances of resembling
conjunctions “are in themselves totally distinct from each other,” the only remaining
explanation is that they “have no union but in the mind, which observes them and
collects their idea” (T 1.3.14, p. 165). Only on the symbolic level of ideas is it
possible, in other words, to recognize the same in what is always different, or the
necessary in what is always contingent, but this implies, at the very least, the necessity
of referring to habits as internal states always available to the mind that deals with the
external environment. For Hume “necessity ... is the effect of this observation, and is
nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our
thoughts from one object to another” (T 1.3.14, p. 165). This determination arises not
from reality or from some deity; rather it “belongs entirely to the soul, which
considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances” (T 1.3.14, p. 166). In
the Enquiry Hume states even more explicitly that “when we say, therefore, that one
object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in
our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each
other’s existence” (EHU 7.59, p. 76; italics added). Hume is perfectly aware that such
a statement might seem extravagant and ridiculous, especially if it were superficially
understood as a way of explaining causality as the outcome of direct emanation by the
mind, “as if causes did not operate entirely independent of the mind, and wou’d not
continue their operation, even tho’ there was no mind existent to contemplate them, or
reason concerning them” (T 1.3.14, p. 167). Yet Hume does not mean at all to deny the
autonomy of reality compared to the observer; he starts rather from the assumption
that every time a necessary connection between an effect and its related cause is
observed, one may legitimately ask: who is the observer? 
Pushing Hume’s reasoning a little further, it might be said that it makes no sense
to deny the existence of any reality, even assuming that suddenly every observer in the
world would disappear. But at the same time one may state that in this case no such
thing as reality would any longer exist, because it would lack the possibility of
observing the world itself through the distinction real/unreal. So Hume’s approach
underlies the conviction that the claim to observe reality without any observer is
essentially self-contradictory. This is the modernity of his thought. While the realist
philosophical tradition bracketed the observer and attributed any causal relationships
to the metaphysical qualities of the real, Hume does the opposite, bracketing reality
and trying to understand how it is possible, in general, to produce inferential
performances.19 The final conclusion of his investigations is that reality is a
construction of the mind, which goes on recursively by comparing the external
correlates of its observations with the internal results of past experience.20 The
19. About the principle of bracketing the reality (or of objectivity in parentheses); see Varela (1985, p. 148) and 
above all Maturana (1990, esp. pp. 55-58).
20. For a constructivist analysis of the problem of causality (with references to Hume) see also Cevolini (2007).
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the relativism of any ideas of necessary connection. Equally, because such a
hypothesis should be compared at least with the possibility of using, as a related term,
an absolute idea of necessary connection, the question is: who observes that absolute
idea, compared to which all other ideas may be conceived of as relative? Rather, the
co-ordination of self- and hetero-reference enables to condense some temporary
results (customs or habits), which provide the mind with some orientation; that is, they
give instructions about the way to proceed in similar situations (e.g., how to use a
handle to open the door), without needing to start all over again every time.21 Such an
orientation can be revised, that is it’s contingent, but this takes nothing away from the
fact that, until it works, that orientation must be felt by the mind as a right correlate of
the necessary nature of reality. This explains, finally, why the observer is normally
compelled to deal with his own experiences as if they were an observation of reality,
and not with reality as if it were an experience of his own observations; and why only
through reflection it may be clarified the internal dynamics of the construction of
external reality.
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